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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
This case serves to put the practitioner on notice that those
matters not expressly stipulated in writing will not be given effect.
ARTICLE 30- REmEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3002: Defense of splitting not available to defendant who
knows of subrogation of portion of property damage claim and
fails to join subrogee in pending action.
The common-law doctrine of election of remedies was con-
ceived as a means of precluding a plaintiff from being unjustly
enriched by a double recovery and of preventing the harassment of
a defendant and the courts with numerous suits involving the same
transaction.17  Although based on valid policy considerations, appli-
cation of the doctrine has produced many harsh results.' CPLR
3002 was intended to modify this doctrine in certain instances. A
related common-law doctrine is the rule against splitting a cause of
action, i.e., the rule that a single and indivisible claim cannot be
divided and made the subject of several suits. 9 When a plaintiff
institutes suit for only part of his damages, a subsequent suit for
the remainder of such damages is thereby precluded. The rule
against splitting has not been codified and the courts have assumed
the responsibility of modifying this doctrine by creating exceptions
thereto.
In Clarcq v. Chamberlain Mobile Home Transport, Inc.,2"
plaintiffs had received judgment in a previous action for breach
of a contract to deliver a trailer and for the loss of the personal
property contained therein; their complaint had specifically excluded
a claim of damages for the trailer itself. Plaintiff's insurance com-
pany paid plaintiff for the value of the trailer and received in
exchange subrogation rights against the defendant. Subsequently, the
plaintiffs, as nominal parties in behalf of their subrogated insurer,
commenced an action to recover payments made to the insured.
Upon the insurer's motion for summary judgment, it was held that
in as much as the defendant had notice of the insurer's position
by means of a demand letter, and did not join it in the first action,
the defense of splitting a cause of action was not available. Since
the defendant had notice of the impending second suit, and there-
fore had the power to avoid a second trial by joining the insurer
in the first action, failure to do so was a waiver of the "splitting"
defense.
17 3 WEINSTEIN, KIORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTCE 3002.01
(196s).
's Cases modifying the doctrine: Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 305 N.Y. 66,
111 N.E.2d 209 (1953); Clark v. Kirby, 243 N.Y. 295, 153 N.E. 79 (1926);
Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N.Y. 308, 144 N.E. 592 (1924).
is CLARK, LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 73 at 473 (2d ed. 1947).
2058 Misc. 2d 227, 294 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1968).
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Significantly, the insured, in its previous suit, had specifically
excluded as an element of damage that for which the insurance
company subsequently sued (loss of the trailer itself). The case
of Pearl Assurawe Company v. Epstein 21 involved similar facts
except that the insured had sought recovery for his entire damages
in his previous action. Also there was no evidence that the de-
fendant had any notice of the insurance company's subrogation
rights. The Court of Appeals under these circumstances concluded
that the rule against splitting a cause of action precluded plaintiff-
insurance company from recovering. Thus, it appears that the rule
against splitting a cause of action is not applicable where at least
a) there is a mutual exclusivity of the damages sought in each
action, and b) the defendant has notice of the insurance company's
rights.
Practitioners are therefore advised that if, in representing a
defendant, notice is received of the subrogation rights of the plain-
tiff's insurer (or plaintiff's assignee), such insurer (or assignee)
should be joined in a pending action in order to avoid multiple
litigation.
CPLR 3013: Court clarifies elements of cause of action versus
insurer for bad faith refusal to settle.
Recently, the appellate division, first department, further de-
fined the material elements of a cause of action against an insur-
ance company for its bad faith refusal to accept a settlement. Most
liability insurance contracts protect the insurer by providing that
the insurance company will represent the insured when he is sued
for matters covered by the contract. In return for the protection
the law has imposed a duty upon insurers to consider the interests
of the insured while representing him in settlement negotiations.
Today, in New York it is well established that an insurance com-
pany may incur liability to an insured, if, in "bad faith," it refuses
to accept a reasonable offer of settlement within the policy limits.22
This rule affords an insured who has had an excess judgment
entered against him (which excess could have been avoided if the
insurance company had acted in good faith) a cause of action.
Until recently, it was unsettled whether the cause of action
accrued when the excess judgment was entered or subsequent to
the insured's payment of such excess. In Henegan v. Merchants
Mutual Insurance Company,23 it was established that a cause of
action is stated by an allegation that an excess judgment has been
entered. The court reasoned that at this point the insured has
21295 N.Y. 674, 65 N.E.2d 325 (1946).
22 Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
544, 552-56 (1968).
2331 App. Div. 2d 12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1968).
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